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Case No. 920126-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first 
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the search warrant affidavit provide probable cause for 
the no-knock nighttime search warrant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In assessing this issue, this Court should read the 
affidavit "in a common sense manner and as a whole," State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App.)(citation omitted), cert, granted, 167 
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991), and determine whether the affidavit 
establishes probable cause for the no-knock nighttime warrant. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14. The standard of review 
of the search warrant affidavit is discussed further in Point I of 
this brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Utah Constitution, Article I section 14 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. Supp.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1) (1990 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2) (1990 Repl. Vol.). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State originally charged Mr. Ruiz with one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance (R. 6-7). 
Defense counsel moved to suppress evidence seized in 
violation of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 25-26). The 
prosecutor filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
suppress (R. 49-51). The parties relied on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
730 (Utah App.), cert, granted/ 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991). 
After hearing argument concerning the sufficiency of the affidavit 
to support the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant,, 
the trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 60, T.6/14/91 
18-21). The trial court ordered the prosecutor to prepare the 
findings and conclusions (T.6/14/91 21), and the prosecutor did so 
(R. 76-80). Defense counsel filed an objection to the findings 
(R. 74-75), and the prosecutor filed a motion for the trial court to 
sign the proposed findings or set a hearing (R. 83-84). The trial 
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court did not sign the proposed findings or set the matter for 
hearing.1 
Mr. Ruiz subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to 
one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony (R. 61, 63-69; T.6/17/91 3-14). The trial court 
sentenced Mr. Ruiz to a term of one to five years in the Utah State 
Prison and fined him $1,000 (with a 25% surcharge) (R. 93-94). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The magistrate issued a no-knock nighttime search warrant 
directing the searching officers to confiscate the following items 
from Rene Montoya and the apartment located at 1975 South 1100 East, 
#8 (R. 52-53): 
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid 
form. Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking 
devices, scales, cutting agents and packaging 
materials. Records pertaining to narcotics 
transactions. U.S. Currency, and all items which 
are determined to be collateral or proceeds from 
narcotics transactions. 
(R. 52). 
The magistrate issued the warrant on the basis of 
information included in the affidavit for the search warrant 
submitted by Officer Craig Watson (R. 54-56) and apparently did not 
make a record of any clarification or supplementation of the 
affidavit. 
1. Because the issue before this Court allows this Court 
to simply review the search warrant affidavit, State v. Weaver, 169 
Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 48 (Utah App. 1991), this Court needs no 
clarification of the trial court's ruling in this case. 
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The magistrate signed the search warrant on June 5, 1990, 
before Rowe was published. 
Copies of the search warrant, affidavit for the search 
warrant, and return are in Appendix 2 to this brief. 
The following quotation of the search warrant affidavit 
distinguishes between the portions of the affidavit which apparently 
were preprinted from the portions which apparently were typed in, by 
underlining the apparently preprinted portions. The references to 
Rene Montoya are underlined in the original affidavit. The portion 
of the affidavit that was written by hand is in bold-face type in 
the following quotation. The paragraphs are numbered in the 
quotation for future reference. The search warrant affidavit 
states, in part, as follows: 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance 
of a Search Warrant are: 
1. Your affiant is a Deputy Sheriff for the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office with over two years 
experience. Your affiant has been assigned to 
the Narcotics Division for one year, and has 
worked as an Undercover Investigator for eight 
months. During which time, your affiant made 
over 170 undercover drug buys. Your affiant has 
been trained by the Utah Peace Officer's 
Standards and Training, the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Training Division, and numerous hours 
of on the job training. Your affiant has also 
received 24 hours training from the Clandestine 
Law Investigators Association (C.L.I.A.), and 24 
hours from the California Narcotics Officers 
Association, (C.N.O.A). 
2. Your affiant, in the past seven days, has 
initiated the purchase of controlled substance 
from inside the address to be searched, 
specifically cocaine. This was done by utilizing 
a confidential informant, (hereafter referred to 
as a C.I.). The circumstances surrounding the 
purchase are described as follows: 
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The C.I. was searched prior to, and immediately 
after the purchase. This was done to ensure no 
other controlled substance, or money, were 
present. The C.I. was given a predetermined 
amount of money. The C.I. was kept under 
constant visual observation from the time of the 
first search, until the second, with the 
exception of the time the C.I. was directly 
inside the residence to be searched. At the time 
of the second search, the C.I. produced a 
substance, which field tested positive for 
cocaine. 
Prior to the above described purchase, your 
affiant received information from a second C.I., 
that a Hispanic, Male, named RENE, was dealing in 
large quantities of cocaine, and he lived in an 
apartment located at approximately 2000 South. 
This C.I. did have the phone number for RENE, and 
gave it to the Sheriff's Office. The number is 
485-6125. This number was checked with telephone 
security, and the subscriber was listed as Rene 
MONTOYA, at 1975 South 1100 East, #18. 
Your affiant has also been advised by Detective 
Keith Stephens, of the Sheriff's Office Narcotics 
division, of a third C.I. he had received 
information from, about a Hispanic, Male, named: 
RENE, who was dealing cocaine at 1975 South 1100 
East. This C.I. gave a description of a vehicle, 
which Rene MONTOYA had been driving. A vehicle 
matching the description has been observed parked 
at the address to be searched by your affiant. 
This C.I. also advised Detective Stephens of the 
intense counter surveillance done by MONTOYA, and 
those who help, and/or work for him. This 
counter surveillance has been observed by your 
affiant. 
YOUR AFFIANT HAS OBSERVED PERSONS WALKING BACK 
AND FORTH IN FRONT OF THE APARTMENT, WRITING DOWN 
LICENSE PLATE #S, WATCHING FOR PERSONS BEING 
FOLLOWED. AND OR JUST BEING A LOOKOUT. 
Your affiant considers the information received 
from the confidential informant reliable because 
(if any information is obtained from an unnamed 
source) All information received from the C.I. 
has proven to be true and accurate. The C.I. has 
always followed instructions exactly as they were 
given. Your affiant has received information 
from three independent confidential sources, 
where-in the information is corroborating. 
9. Your affiant has verified the above information 
from the confidential informant to be correct and 
accurate through the following independent 
investigation: Sheriff's Office records checks 
have verified information received from all 
C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the C.I. 
tested positive for cocaine. 
(R. 55-56). 
The portion of the affidavit seeking nighttime 
authorization states, 
10. WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search 
Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items; 
( ) in the day time. 
(XX) at any time day or night because there is 
reason to believe it is necessary to seize the 
property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, 
damaged, or altered or for other good reasons, to 
vit; 
All narcotics related activity at the address to 
be searched was observed in the evening hours. 
(R. 56). The portion of the affidavit seeking no-knock 
authorization states, 
11. It is further requested that fif appropriate) the 
officer executing the requested warrant not be 
required to give notice of the officer/s 
authority or purpose because: 
(XX) physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given? or 
(XX) the property sought may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because; 
Handguns have been found on most narcotic search 
warrants. 
Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s, which 
indicate he has, and will, use a hand-gun to 
defend his narcotics. 
Counter surveillance has been observed at 1975 
South 1100 East. 
(R. 56). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should hold under Article I section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution that no deference is afforded to the magistrate on 
review of the issuance of a no-knock nighttime search warrant. The 
deference afforded to magistrates issuing search warrants under 
federal law should not be extended to the context of no-knock 
nighttime search warrants and is illogical under the Utah statutory 
scheme. 
When reading the affidavit in this case "in a common sense 
manner and as a whole," Rowe, supra, this Court can see that the 
affidavit fails to establish probable cause for the issuance of the 
no-knock nighttime search warrant. Facial discrepancies in the 
affidavit that were never clarified by the magistrate preclude a 
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. The 
affidavit does not state adequate facts to allow a neutral and 
detached assessment by a magistrate. The affidavit fails to 
establish the statutory predicates for the issuance of a no-knock 
nighttime search warrant. 
Because the "barebones" affidavit was patently inadequate 
to justify the issuance of the no-knock nighttime search warrant, 
the officer's search cannot be justified under the federal "good 
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, which does not apply 
under the Utah Constitution. 
The evidence seized pursuant to the no-knock nighttime 




THIS COURT SHOULD 
READ THE AFFIDAVIT AND DETERMINE IF 
THE AFFIDAVIT PROVIDES PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME WARRANT. 
Under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that reviewing courts are to grant a magistrate's 
issuance of a search warrant great deference and review for a 
"substantial basis" for the issuance of the warrant, rather than for 
probable cause, theorizing that if reviewing courts scrutinize 
warrant affidavits too closely, that will somehow discourage police 
from seeking warrants prior to conducting searches. See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
The first problem with the deference afforded to the 
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is the vagueness of 
the "substantial basis" test. Search warrants should only issue if 
the search warrant affidavits establish probable cause, by asserting 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is 
"a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983). Yet under the United States Supreme Court's standards, 
reviewing courts are to read the affidavits for a "substantial 
basis" for the issuance of the search warrants and are expressly not 
to review for probable cause. Id. at 236. The "substantial basis" 
test is abstruse. "Either an affidavit establishes probable cause 
or it does not." State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 50 (Utah 
App. 1991)(Orme, J., concurring). 
-8 -
The second problem with the deference afforded to the 
magistrates by the United States Supreme Court is that this 
deference undercuts the critical role of meaningful judicial review 
in enforcing citizens' rights to privacy. The historical importance 
of meaningful judicial review of the issuance of warrants can be 
appreciated through review of the appendix to State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730, 740-743 (Utah App. 1991). Police officers preparing 
search warrant affidavits and magistrates issuing warrants are most 
likely to do the best job of upholding the constitutions if they are 
stimulated to do so by meaningful judicial review. Id. at 743. 
Rather than requiring police and magistrates to follow the 
constitutional requirements of securing search warrants based on 
probable cause prior to searches, with the "substantial basis" test, 
the United States Supreme Court tacitly informs police officers and 
magistrates that if the officers and magistrates will at least file 
the paperwork before the searches, the courts may be willing to look 
the other way if the paperwork is substantively lacking in probable 
cause. See State v. Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49 (Utah App. 
1991)(Orme, J. concurring)("The stated reason [for deferring to the 
magistrates' probable cause finding] ... is to encourage the use of 
warrants. ... It should be reason enough to rigidly require the 
use of warrants that the Constitution requires them and further 
requires that they be supported by probable cause.")(citations 
omitted). 
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The unique statutory scheme in Utah calls for evenhanded 
and meaningful review of all search warrant affidavits. In seeking 
search warrants, police may approach any justice, judge, or justice 
of the peace in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (1991 Cum. 
Supp.)(allowing all judges and justices of any court to act as 
magistrates). As the Court reviewing many search warrant 
affidavits, and as the Court composed of seven magistrates, this 
Court is in a position to take judicial notice of the fact that Utah 
magistrates do not uniformly have the opportunity to develop 
expertise in issuing search warrants. It appears that those 
magistrates with the most experience in evaluating the affidavits 
obtain that experience because the police most often solicit search 
warrants from these select magistrates. Judicial review is most 
important in these circumstances, to insure the neutrality and 
detachment of the magistrates. Under the Utah statutory scheme, it 
cannot be said that magistrates should be deferred to because they 
develop expertise through repeated exposure to search warrant 
affidavits. See State v. Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50 (Utah 
App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to 
magistrates might be justified by their expertise developed through 
repeated experience with search warrant affidavits). 
Under the Utah statutory scheme, magistrates are directed 
to receive evidence in support of search warrants in written form or 
to record the evidence verbatim and have the record transcribed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(1) (1990 Repl.). In these circumstances, 
the magistrates should not be privy to information unavailable to 
-10-
reviewing courts, and the scope of information available to the 
magistrates does not provide a basis for deferring to the 
magistrates. See State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50 
(Utah App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that 
deference to magistrates might be justified because magistrates have 
the opportunity to clarify affidavits when they are presented, and 
appellate courts may not be privy to the information available to 
the magistrate, but stating, "On the other hand, such explanations 
should be made of record even if only by appropriate interlineation 
of the affidavit."). 
Under the Utah statutory scheme, it cannot be said that 
magistrates should be deferred to because they are at an 
institutional disadvantage and lack the resources of reviewing 
courts. See State v. Weaver. 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49-50 (Utah 
App. 1991)(Orme, J. concurring)(noting hypothesis that deference to 
magistrates might be justified because magistrates operate at an 
"institutional disadvantage," without the time and resources 
available to appellate judges.). As an initial matter, evaluation 
of search warrant affidavits does not require great resources—it 
simply requires a thoughtful reading of the affidavits. As a 
secondary matter, it seems curious that an appellate court would 
exalt sympathy for the "institutionally disadvantaged" magistrates 
over the fundamental constitutional rights at stake in search and 
seizure cases. Most importantly, in Utah, police have the 
opportunity to forum shop. Every justice, judge and justice of the 
peace is authorized to act as magistrate. The fact that the police 
choose to patronize the magistrates with the least resources is 
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reason for meaningful appellate review and does not call for 
deference to the magistrates. 
It appears that none of the United States Supreme Court 
cases directing reviewing courts to defer to the magistrates 
involves no-knock nighttime search warrants. This country has a 
long history of reprobation of no-knock nighttime searches. See 
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958). No-knock nighttime 
search warrants pose extreme dangers to searching officers and 
others inside or near the premises to be searched and involve an 
extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the home. See 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, 
(Utah App.)(main opinion and concurring opinion of 
Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by no-knock nighttime search 
warrants), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991). The 
unique threats posed by no-knock nighttime search warrants call for 
intense judicial review and counsel against deference to the 
magistrates. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah 
App.)(Garff, J., concurring)("[W]henever a 'canned,' or preprinted 
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative 
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying 
the search warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the 
affidavit are insufficient. This is particularly critical when the 
warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home.11), 
cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 
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26 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 703-04 (Utah 
1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining the need for judicial 
scrutiny of no-knock searches). 
Numerous Utah cases have recognized that it is appropriate 
for Utah courts to decide search and seizure cases on the basis of 
independent Utah law. See Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 
1939)(decided under Article I section 14; striking statute 
purporting to allow search warrant affidavits based on the belief of 
the affiant, rather than stating the underlying facts). See also 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991); State v, LaRocco. 794 
P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990)(plurality); State v, Nielsen. 727 P.2d 
188, 192-93 (Utah 1986); State v. Hvah. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 
1985)(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Because federal deference to magistrates undercuts 
important rights established by Article I section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and is illogical in the context of the Utah statutory 
scheme, this Court should read affidavits in support of the no-knock 
nighttime search warrants and determine if they state sufficient 
facts to provide probable cause for the issuance of the warrants, 
without any deference to the magistrates. Constitution of Utah, 
Article I section 14. 
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II. 
THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT. 
A. SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS MUST PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FACTS FROM 
WHICH A MAGISTRATE MAY MAKE AN INDEPENDENT FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
This Court set forth the federal law on how a magistrate is 
to assess search warrant affidavits for probable cause, in State v. 
Weaver, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (1991), explaining, 
Probable cause is to be determined by the 
totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. 
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
2332-33 (1983). 
Under this analysis, the magistrate must 
"make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' 
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.11 Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 
Id. at 47 (citations omitted). 
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test has 
not wholly supplanted the Acruilar-Spinelli test in the evaluation of 
affidavits based on information provided by informants. For 
instance, in State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985), the court 
stated, 
[I]n State v. Bailev. [675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 
1984),] we observed that even under the Gates 
"totality of the circumstances" standard, 
compliance with the Aauilar-Spinelli guidelines 
might be necessary to establish the requisite 
"fair probability" that the evidence sought 
actually exists and can be found where the 
informant so states. However, in other cases, "a 
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's 
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be 
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required, if the circumstances as a whole 
indicate that the informant's report is 
truthful.11 [Bailey, at 1205-06]. 
Id. at 1101-02 (footnotes omitted). When the totality of 
circumstances indicates the truthfulness of the informant's report, 
the showing of the informant's basis of knowledge and veracity and 
reliability may be "less strong," but there must still be some 
showing of each of these three things. Id. 
Affidavits relying on police informants, rather than named 
citizen informants, logically require heightened scrutiny. In State 
v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846 (Utah 1972), the court explained, "Recent 
case law has acknowledged that a different rationale exists for 
establishing the reliability of named citizen informers as opposed 
to unnamed police informers, who are frequently criminals. Those in 
the latter category often proffer information in exchange for some 
concession, payment, or simply out of revenge against the subject? 
under such circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of 
their credibility or reliability." Id. at 848 (emphasis added and 
deleted). The court indicated that the testimony of police 
informers is viewed with "rigid scrutiny." id. Accord State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286-287 and n.4 (Utah App. 1990)(police 
informant testimony may require showing of "veracity, reliability, 
and basis of knowledge" if circumstances do not "readily indicate 
the truthfulness of the informant."). 
Search warrant affidavits must provide sufficient factual 
allegations for the magistrate to make an independent factual 
assessment of probable cause. Our state supreme court recognized 
the importance of the exercise of independent factual assessment by 
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magistrates in Allen v. Lindbeck. 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939). Acting 
under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the court 
struck a statute authorizing the issuance of search warrants on the 
basis of the affiant's belief of facts, stating, 
"A warrant to search and seize, which follows 
upon a statement based solely upon the belief of 
the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the 
affiant, based upon the secret facts of which he 
may have knowledge, and the conclusion which 
results from such reasoning is affiant's, not 
that of the judicial officer. The judicial 
process to ascertain probable cause is then 
transferred from the judicial officer to the 
affiant. The Constitution permits no such thing." 
Id. at 924-925 (citation omitted). 
Numerous other cases decided under federal law have 
recognized that, in the absence of sufficient factual bases in 
search warrant affidavits, magistrates cannot act with the requisite 
detachment and neutrality in issuing search warrants. See 
Giordanello v. United States. 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958)(arrest 
warrant); Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 111-14 (1964); 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933); Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). 
Evidence seized under warrants obtained by magistrates' 
"rubberstamping" of "barebones" affidavits must be suppressed; the 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when 
the police proceed on the basis of such affidavits and warrants. 
State v. Droneburq. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah App. 1989); State 
v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991). 
-16-
B. SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS SEEKING NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH 
WARRANTS MUST MEET SPECIFIC CRITERIA. 
No-knock nighttime searches involve severe dangers to 
searching officers and others inside or near the premises to be 
searched, extreme intrusion into the privacy and solitude of the 
home, and the destruction of property. See State v* Rove. 806 P.2d 
730, 734 n.5, 738-40, and nn.10 and 11, (Utah App.)(main opinion and 
concurring opinion of Garff, J.)(discussing the dangers posed by 
no-knock nighttime search warrants), cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah 1991); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08, 
313 n.12 (1958)(interpreting federal knock and announce statute); 
LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 4.8(a) at 272-273; State v. Buck. 756 
P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). No-knock nighttime searches have met 
with judicial disfavor throughout the history of the United States. 
See Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493, 498-500 (1958); Miller v. 
United States. 357 U.S. 301 (1958). 
Because of the dangers historically recognized in no-knock 
nighttime searches, magistrates are to proceed with caution in 
evaluating search warrant affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime 
search warrants. See State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 739-740 (Utah 
App.)(Garff, J., concurring)(M[W]henever a 'canned,' or preprinted 
affidavit is presented to a magistrate, he or she has an affirmative 
responsibility to scrutinize the factual circumstances justifying 
the search warrant. Conclusory or ambiguous statements in the 
affidavit are insufficient. This is particularly critical when the 
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warrant authorizes nighttime intrusion into a person's home.11), 
cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991); State v. Buck. 756 
P.2d 700, 703-04 (Utah 1988)(Zimmerman, J., concurring)(explaining 
the need for judicial scrutiny of no-knock searches). 
Even when no-knock nighttime search warrants are issued in 
compliance with pertinent statutes, the searches still must meet 
constitutional standards of reasonableness. See Ker v. California. 
374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963); United State v. Mitchell. 783 F.2d 971, 
973-74 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 860 (1986); Bovance v. 
Myers. 398 F.2d 896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968); State v. Lindner. 592 P.2d 
852, 858 (Idaho 1979), LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 4.7(b) 264-267; 
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 739 n.ll (Utah App.), cert, granted„ 
167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991). 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2), in order to issue 
a no-knock warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit 
or supplemental record which provide "proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given." 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5(1), in order to issue 
a nighttime warrant, the magistrate must have facts in the affidavit 
or supplemental record which provide "a reasonable cause to believe 
a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good 
reason[.]" Under the current statute, it is not enough for the 
issuance of the nighttime warrant to show that the evidence is 
likely to be present at night; there must be a reason why the search 
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must occur at night, rather than during the day. State v. Rove, 806 
P.2d 730, 733 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Utah 1991); LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264 and n.20. 
C. THE AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE 
OF THE NO-KNOCK NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT. 
Certain fundamental problems apparent on the face of the 
search warrant and affidavit indicate that, in issuing the no-knock 
nighttime search warrant without further clarification, the 
magistrate was acting as more of a rubber stamp than as a neutral 
and detached arbiter of probable cause. 
The warrant itself demonstrates a delegation of judicial 
authority by the magistrate to the police. The warrant seeks to 
seize "U.S. Currency, and all items which are determined to be 
collateral or proceeds from narcotics transactions.11 This portion 
of the warrant transforms the warrant into a general warrant, giving 
the searching officers unlimited discretion to search for and seize 
property that has no apparent connection to the crimes at issue, 
possession of illegal drugs, and possession with intent to 
distribute. Such general warrants are illegal. See State v. 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985)("The fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires that 'no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the things . . . to be seized.' This 
portion of the amendment is essentially a proscription against 
general warrants whereby administrative officers determine what is 
and what is not to be seized. The decision to seize must be 
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judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be 
sufficiently particular to guide the officer to the thing intended 
to be seized, thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted invasion 
of privacy.")(emphasis added). 
The first noticeable problem with the affidavit is that the 
affidavit refers to two apartments—#8 and #18, while the search 
warrant is limited to one apartment—#8. The facts in the affidavit 
apparently relating to apartment #8 are that Officer Watson 
initiated through a confidential informant a controlled buy of an 
unidentified quantity of cocaine from an unidentified person or 
persons inside the "residence to be searched" (Aff• J52 and 3). The 
allegation that a car matching a confidential informant's 
description of the car of an alleged cocaine dealer, Rene Montoya, 
was observed parked at "the address to be searched" (Aff. f5) might 
arguably apply to apartment #8 since apartment # 8 is the address to 
be searched. However, there is no indication in the affidavit that 
the parking is correlated to the apartment numbers. 
The information in the affidavit relating specifically to 
apartment #18 indicates that apartment #18 is the location of the 
telephone with the number 485-6125, the telephone number subscribed 
to by Rene Montoya, the telephone number provided by a confidential 
informant who indicated that the person with this phone number was a 
hispanic male named Rene, who was dealing in large quantities of 
cocaine at approximately 2000 South (Aff. f4). 
The other assertions in the affidavit, including references 
to counter-surveillance and threatened use of a gun to protect 
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narcotics, do not refer specifically to apartment #8 or #18 but are 
alleged against Rene or Montoya, the person listed as the telephone 
subscriber in apartment #18 (Aff. 515-7, 10-11). 
It may be that Rene Montoya (named in the search warrant 
affidavit) and Rene Ruiz (the appellant) are different people who 
were living in separate apartments at the time the magistrate signed 
the search warrant. It may be that the affidavit contains a 
typographical error in mentioning apartments #8 and #18. Such 
possibilities may have grave consequences in the context of no-knock 
nighttime searches, and the magistrate should have clarified this 
facial problem with the affidavit prior to issuing the warrant. See 
Judge Garff's concurring opinion in Rowe, supra (noting magistrates' 
duty to scrutinize affidavits, particularly in cases seeking 
no-knock nighttime warrants). 
The second facial problem with the affidavit is that it 
fails to provide an adequate showing of the reliability, veracity 
and basis of knowledge of the confidential informants. In this case 
involving multiple confidential informants, the paragraphs of the 
affidavit relating to the reliability of the information from 
confidential informants do not make clear reference to any 
informant, stating, 
8. Your affiant considers the information received 
from the confidential informant reliable because 
(if any information is obtained from an unnamed 
source) All information received from the C.I. 
has proven to be true and accurate. The C.I. has 
always followed instructions exactly as they were 
given. Your affiant has received information 
from three independent confidential sources, 
where-in the information is corroborating. 
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9. Your affiant has verified the above information 
from the confidential informant to be correct and 
accurate through the following independent 
investigation; Sheriff's Office records checks 
have verified information received from all 
C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the C.I. 
tested positive for cocaine. 
(R. 55-56). See State v. Bailey, supra (requiring a showing of 
confidential informants' veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge). 
The third facial problem with the affidavit is that it is 
too vague to allow independent neutral and detached assessment by a 
magistrate. Aside from the information relating to the controlled 
buy which occurred during the seven days prior to the typing of the 
affidavit, and Officer Watson's receipt of information from the 
confidential informant with Rene Montoya's phone number sometime 
"prior to" the controlled buy, none of the allegations are tied to 
any timeframe. See e.g. People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo. 
1981)("The grounds in an affidavit for a search warrant must have a 
relationship to the date and the time that the warrant is issued."; 
stale information does not provide probable cause). Because 
critical portions of the affidavit are drafted in passive voice, the 
affidavit does not reflect whether the confidential informants 
discussed in paragraphs 4 through 6 had personal knowledge of the 
information they relayed, or whether the confidential informants 
mentioned in paragraphs 4 through 6 and 11 spoke directly to the 
police or were quoted to the police by other sources. See Go-Bart 
Importing Co. v. United States. 282 U.S. 344 (1931)(warrants are not 
to issue on the basis of "loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact."). 
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The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory 
prerequisite to the issuance of a no-knock warrant, that "the object 
of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or 
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2). In the instant case, the affidavit 
gives no specification as to the amount of drugs expected in 
apartment #8 and does not indicate the amount involved in the 
controlled buy. However, the information from the confidential 
informant with the phone number for apartment #18 indicates that 
"Rene" was dealing in "large quantities of drugs." The affidavit 
and warrant seek additional items that are not readily destroyed: 
paraphernalia, records, and currency and "proceeds". Because the 
affidavit did not allege facts establishing probable cause to 
believe that the no-knock warrant was necessary to prevent the 
destruction of evidence, the magistrate should not have signed the 
warrant. See Rowe at 733-734 n.3 ("A more particularized showing 
may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is 
sought. In such cases, as where the affiant has information of the 
on-going cultivation or manufacture of drugs, the exigency of ready 
destructability, inherent with small quantities of drugs, may not be 
present."). 
The no-knock warrant was not justified by the assertion 
that "Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s which indicate he 
has, and will, use a hand-gun to defend his narcotics," for three 
reasons. First, there is no indication that Montoya, the phone 
subscriber in apartment #18, lived in apartment #8, the place to be 
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searched, according to the warrant. Second, the veracity and 
reliability of the confidential informants is unclear from the 
affidavit, and it is not clear that these informants gave this 
information to the police or were quoted to the police by other 
informants. Third/ the allegations concerning the gun are not tied 
to any timeframe. 
The affidavit fails to demonstrate the statutory 
prerequisite to the issuance of a nighttime warrant, that Ma search 
is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good 
reason[.]fl Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1). See also LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 4.7(b) 264 and n.20 (explaining that under Utah's current 
type of statute, affidavit must provide an adequate reason as to why 
the search must occur at night); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 733 
(Utah App.)(same), cert, granted. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
1991). There is nothing in the affidavit explaining why apartment 
#8 had to be searched at night, rather than in the day. As 
previously discussed, the evidence to be seized was not evanescent, 
and there is nothing to indicate that its seizure was more necessary 
at night than in the day. Inasmuch as all drug activity and 
presumably all of the "intense counter-surveillance" occurred at 
night (Aff. 110), issuance of a nighttime search warrant posed 
uniquely high dangers in this case and was improper. See State v. 
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 734 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)("For example, if the 
supporting affidavit made a particularized showing that drugs were 
likely to be sold or consumed over the course of the night and 
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evidence thereby lost, or that the supply was likely to be 
imminently moved en masse to a different location during the night, 
or that a safer search was likely at night because the house was 
abustle with activity during the day and no one but the occupant was 
likely to be home at night, then the propriety of a nighttime search 
becomes manifest• We caution that a mere incantation of such 
circumstances will not justify a nighttime search—the required 
factual showing is not one which is conducive, for example, to 
preprinted language.")(emphasis added), cert, granted, 167 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah 1991). See generally Rowe; State v. Droneburg, 781 
P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989). 
The federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule 
has not been and should not be adopted under the exclusionary rule 
of Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See Rowe at 
737-738 and appendix to Rowe opinion at 740-743. Even if the "good 
faith" exception could be applied in this state, it does not apply 
in this case because no officer could rely in good faith on the 
barebones affidavit submitted in this case. See Rowe at 738 (good 
faith exception does not apply when magistrate acts as a rubber 
stamp). 
The violations in this case are substantive and require 
suppression. The affidavit and warrant are too vague to support a 
finding of probable cause to search particularly in a no-knock 
nighttime manner, and constitute violations of the fourth amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. The affidavit fails to establish statutory 
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grounds for a no-knock nighttime warrant. Suppression is the 
appropriate remedy for the substantive rights violations involved 
here. Rowe at 738. See State v. LaRocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465-73 
(Utah 1990)(plurality)(adopting exclusionary rule under Article I 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and reserving judgment on 
whether or not the court will adopt exceptions to the Utah 
exclusionary rule). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Ruiz's motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1992. 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Mr. Ruiz 
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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-3 (1991 Cum. Supp.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-1-3• Definitions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
. . . 
(4) ,fMagistrate" means a justice of 
the Supreme Court, a judge of the district 
courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a 
judge of the circuit courts and a justice of 
the peace or a judge of any court created by 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-4 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and 
witnesses—Witness not in physical presence of 
magistrate—Duplicate original warrants—Return. 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a 
magistrate in the issuance of a search 
warrant shall be given on oath and either 
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. 
Transcription of the recorded testimony need 
not precede the issuance of the warrant. 
Any person having standing to contest the 
search may request and shall be provided 
with a transcription of the recorded 
testimony in support of the application for 
the warrant. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-5 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-23-5. Time for service—Officer may request 
assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a 
direction in the warrant that it be served 
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or 
oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
believe a search is necessary in the night 
to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or 
for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any 
time of the day or night. An officer may 
request other persons to assist him in 
conducting the search. 
Utah Code Ann, section 77-23-10 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
77-23-10. Force used in executing warrant--
Notice of authority prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may use such force 
as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
• • • 
(2) Without notice of his authority 
and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result 
to any person if notice were given. 
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C O J N T V OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
Tz ar.y Deacr officer in the State of Utah. 
Frcof oy Affidavit under oath having been made this Jay before me 
Detective C. Watson-SLCOSO • * I am satisfied tnat therr .i 
pror^aoie cars? to oeiieve 
:f:*ut OCX) on the persoru's) of Rene MONTOYA, a male Hispanic, age: 
approximately 30 years, height: 5 f2 u, weight: 145 pounds. 
( ) in the ver;icle(s) described as 
•XX) oa the premises known as 1975 South 1100 East, #8, the 
upper south-east unit of an apartment building. 
I i tne City of Salt Lake • County of Salt Lake. State o r 
iJtar., tnere is now certain prooerty or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid form. 
Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking devices, scales, cutting agent 
and packaging materials. Records pertaining to narcotics transactions. 
U.S. Currency, and all items which are determined to be collateral or 
proceeds from narcotics transactions. 
an.j that said property or evidence: 
OCX) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
OCX) nas been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
6(X) is being possessed with the ourpose to use it as a mei.i* 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
OCX) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of iilesa" 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a oarty to 
the illegal conduct, [Note requirements of Utah Code 




You i r e t i i e r e f o r e com:nanded 
C ) in the day time 
at any time day or night (good cause having been shown'' 
to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oatn being shown that the object of this search inv 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm !:•' 
result to any person if notice were given) 
to make a search of the 
ve.'iiclef s ) , and premises for 
evidence and if you find tur 
fort.i-wit.-i before me at the ri 
State- of Utah, or retain sue 
t;ie order of tnis court. 
above-named or described person' 
the herein-above described property 
same or any part thereof, to briru 
"ti; Circuit Court, County of Salt La 




otVfc.N UMJEK HANI) and d a t e d t n i s 
COJI: 
000=53 
IX THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
!.»' AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATc Or UTAH ) 
J> 3 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDV/T =}R SEARCH WARRANT 
tt L T J i\ L 
A \FFlpW: =}R SEARCH WARRANT 
•: ihcllafftr rtAtk&$ 430 Soutn 2nd East 
' i .»•,-• j JT A n ris t e c J V J J L ADDRESS 
.7...- undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and Sa/3: 
Taut .iv has reason to believe 
7..-*; '.XX oi tne psrsonCs) of Rene MONTOYA, a male Hispanic, age 
approximately 30 years, height: 5'2"f weight: 145 pounds. 
% ) i«i t:ie vehicle(s) described as 
(XX o-\ the premises knowi as 1975 South 1100 East, #8, 
the upper south-east unit of an apartment building. 
th 
:itv of Salt Lake 
:i*e is now certain or 
County of Salt Lak?, 
evidence described as 
State 
property 
Cocaine, a white substance in powder or solid form. 
Drug paraphernalia, specifically smoking devices, scales, cutting agen 
and packaging materials. Records pertaining to narcotics transactions 
U.S. Currency, and all items which are determined to be collateral or 





has been used to commit or conceal a 
is being possessed with the purpose 
of committing or concealing a public 
consists of an item 
conduct, possessed by 
consists of an item 
conduct, possessed by 
the illegal conduct. 
Annotated, 77-23-5(2}] 
public offense, o 
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Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of *he crime(s) of Possession of a controlled snh^anrft. and/-
Possession of a controlled substance with the intent to d i ^ - ^ - ^ 
ArriDnVIl FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Th" zicis to establish tiie grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
J re : 
Your affiant is a Deputy Sheriff for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office with over two years experience. Your affiant has been assigned 
to the Narcotics Division for one year, and has worked as an Undercover • 
Investigator for eight months. During which time, your affiant made 
over 170 undercover drug buys. Your affiant has been trained by the 
Utah Peace Officer's Standards and Training, the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Training Division, and numerous hours of on the job training. 
Your affiant has also received 24 hours training from the Clandestine I' 
Investigators Association, {C.L.I.A.), and 24 hours from the California l 
Narcotics Officers Association, (C.N.O.A.). 
Your affiant, in the past seven days, has initiated the purchase of 
controlled substance from inside the address to be searched, specifica^ 
cocaine. This was done by utilizing a confidential informant, 
(hereafter referred to as a C.I.). The circumstances surrounding the 
purchase are described as follows: 
The C.I. was searched prior to, and immediately after the purchase. 
This was done to ensure no other controlled substance, or money, were 
present. The C.I. was given a pre-determined amount of money. The 
C.I. was kept under constant visual observation from the time of the 
first search, until the second, with the exception of the time the C.I. 
was directly inside the residence to be searched. At the time of the 
second search, the C.I. produced a substance, which field tested 
positive for cocaine. 
Prior to the above described purchase, your affiant received informatior 
from a second C.I., that a Hispanic, Male, named RENE, was dealing in 
large quantities of cocaine, and he lived in an apartment located at 
approximately 2000 South. This C.I. did have the phone number for RENE, 
and gave it to the Sheriff's Office. The number is 485-6125. This 
number was checked with telephone security, and the subscriber was 
listed as Rene MONTOYA, at 1975 South 1100 East, #18. 
Your affiant has also been advised by Detective Keith Stephens, of the 
Sherifffs Office Narcotics Division, of a third C.I. he had received 
information from, about a Hispanic, Male, named: RENE, who was dealing 
cocaine at 1975 South 1100 East. This C.I. gave a description of a 
vehicle, which Rene MONTOYA had been driving. A vehicle matching the 
description has been observed parked at the address to be searched by 
your affiant. 
This C.I. also advised Detective Stephens of the intense counter 
surveillance done by MONTOYA, and those who help, and/or work for 
him. This counter surveillance has been observed by your affiant. 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Your dffiant considers tJie information received from the confidential 
informant reliaole because (if any information is obtained from an 
unaamed source) All information received from the C.I. has proven to 1 
true and accurate. The C.I. has always followed instructions exactly 
as they were given. Your affiant has received information from three 
independent confidential sources, where-in the information is 
corroborating. 
Your affiant nas verified t.ie above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following 
independent investigation: Sheriff's Office records checks have verifi 
information received from all C.I.'s. All substances purchased by the 
C.I. tested positive for cocaine. 
I; ii£K£F0r'iI, t:ie affiant prays tiat a Search Warrant be issued for t.v* 
seicjre of s^:d iteuis: 
) i'i the d< time 
#X) a-
 an^ time day or night because there is reason t~ 
ueiieve it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other gooi reasons, to-wit: 
All narcotics related activity at the address to be 
searched was observed in the evening hours. 
T: is further requested that (if appropriate) tne officer executing 
t*,<> requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's 
authority or purpose because: 
#X) paysical ham may result to any person if notice werz 
given; or 
fi§ t.ie property sought may be quickly destroyed, dispose: 
of* or secreted. 
T^is danger is believed to exist because: 
Hand-guns have been found on most narcotic search warrants. 
Montoya has made statements to two C.I.'s, which indicate he has, and 
will, use a hand-gun to defend his narcotics. 
Counter surveillance has been observed at 1975 South 1100 East. 
AFFIANT ^ M JA 




J  fef'MHB TOa*/CIRCUIT COURT, 
i AND I^lSAXJjSfiAJPE COUNTY, STATE 
•• UTAH ^kiLg&r i 
RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
The personal property (XXXXXXXX^OTset out on the inventory 
attached hereto) was taken from the premises located and described 
as 1975 South 1100 East, #8 
and from the vehicle(s) described as n/a 
and from the person(s) of n/a 
by virtue of a search warrant dated the 5th day of June 
1924* 
and executed by Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
of the above-entitled court: Third Circuit Court 
I, era j g Watson t by whom this warrant was executed, 
do swear that the (£&#X#/att ached) inventory contains a true and 
detailed account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, 
on the 5th day of Juney 1990. 
00057 
The following will be a list of items seized pursuant to a search 
warrant at 1975 South 1100 East, #8, on the date of June 5th, 1990. 
Narcotics: Page A: 
#1: Seven small bags of cocaine, (each containing one-
sixteenth of an ounce), and one small bag of heroin, 
(containing one gram). 
#2: A small amount of cocaine. 
Paraphernalia: Page B: 
#1: One red scale, 
#2: One syringe, and cooker. 
#3: One box of baggies. 
Guns/Knives: Page C: 
#1: One Rino, .22 calibre, pearl handle, 
number: 32724. 
#2: One Hialeah, .38 calibre, pearl handle, 
Derringer, number: 04156. 
#3: One Sterling, .22 calibre, black handle, 
number: E12519. 
#4: One Luger, .22 calibre, brown handle, 
number: CL07675. 
#5: A silver handle knife. 
Money: Page D: 
#1: Eight hundred and forty two dollars, 
($842.00), in U.S. Currency. 
#2: One thousand one hundred thirty seven dol lars , 
($1137.00), in U.S. Currency. 
non^p 
All of tne property taken by virtue of said warrant will be 
retained in niy custody subject to the order of this court of or any 
other court in which the offense in respect to which the property or 
things taken, is triable. 
* / • 
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